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WILLARD T. BARBOUR
The faculty of the Yale Law School has once more suffered a very
heavy loss. Professor Willard T. Barbour died of pneumonia on
March 2, 1920. Professor Barbour entered upon his duties at Yale
last September, having been chosen to fill the Southmayd Professor-
ship and to give courses in equity and legal history. In the short
period since then he had already won the love and respect of his
students and his fellow teachers. His exceptional educational training,
his assured loyalty to this school, his strong common sense, his almost
boyish enthusiasm, and his gifted and winning personality had already
made certain a successful and productive career at Yale.
Professor Barbour graduated from the University of Michigan,
receiving the degree of B.A. in 19o5 and the degree of LL.B. in 19o8.
Later he spent three years at Oxford, doing original research in the
field of legal history under 'Sir Paul Vinogradoff. This resulted in
[654]
COMMENTS
his publishing his History of Contract in Early English Equity, in the
Oxford Studies in Jurisprudence. In 1912, Oxford conferred upon
him the degree of B.Litt. From 1912 to 1919 he was first assistant
professor and then professor of law in the University of Michigan
Law School. There, as at Yale, he received ungrudging recognition
as a legal scholar and the deepest of affection as a man. Professor
Barbour had published several scholarly and original articles in law
reviews and had just begun a series of lectures on legal history on the
Carpentier foundation at Columbia University. The Yale Law School
takes pride in its recognition of his already high accomplishment, holds
in high regard the memory of his modest and winning personality, and
mourns the heavy and untimely loss to legal scholarship and to the
profession of law teaching.
POWER OF EQUITY OVER PUBLIC ELECTIONS
In a recent Illinois case the secretary of state proposed to submit
to the electors certain questions of public policy. It was alleged that
to do so would 'be to exceed his power under the state constitution,
and an injunction was asked to prevent it. It was held that "the
court had no jurisdictidn";' that "an injunction would not issue out
of a court of equity for the purpose of restraining the holding of an
election or in any manner directing the mode in which the same should
be conducted" on the ground that it was a matter of a political nature,
with which courts ot equity had nothing to do. Emerson v. Payne
(1919, Ill.) 125 N. E. 329. This limitation on the power of equity
is asserted by the highest authorities,2 but some of those courts which
adopt it are inclined to leave for themselves a loophole; 8 and in the
last thirty years in some very important cases it has been disregarded
when a public wrong without other adequate remedy demanded it.4
'The court evidently meant no power to render any valid decree, even an
erroneous one. For comment on the ambiguity of the word "jurisdiction" see
(1915) I5 CoL. L. REv. io6-io 7 and COmmENT (gIg) 28 YALE LAW JourNAL,
483, note 4.
24 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. igig) sec. 1753. "The traditional
limits of proceedings in equity have not embraced a remedy for political wrongs.
Holmes, J., in Giles v. Harris (19o3) I89 U. S. 475, 486, 23 Sup. Ct. 639, 642.
"'We sh6uld not care to commit ourselves to the doctrine that a court of
equity will not under any circumstance interfere for the protection of political
rights." Winnett v. Adams (904) 71 Neb. 817, 825, 99 N. W. 681, 684.
'State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham (I892) 83 Wis. 90, 53 N. W. 35 (restraint
of election under unconstitutional apportionment law); People v. Tool (1o5)
35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224 (injunction against conducting an election fraud-
ulently) ; cf. Giddings v. Blacker (1892) 93 Mich. I, 52 N. W. 944 (mandamus
used to restrain, in the absence of original jurisdiction to grant injunction);
cf. Attorney General v. Suffolk County Commissioners (I916) 224 Mass. S8,
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An analysis of a long series of cases in Illinois that have had much
to do with the firm establishment of this limitation will show that the
grounds for it are two. In the first place elections seldom threaten
to cause direct damage to property, and "property" relations are
the usual hasis for injunctive relief. This basis for judicial action of
any kind is historical and not altogether logical, as Dean Pound has
pointed out.5 That it has resulted in some unjust situations in our
law cannot be doubted,6 but it is deep-rooted in our legal thought.
The courts often strain a layman's understanding of the word property
until its meaning is even more elusive than usual, in order to avoid
the force of the rule and to vindicate something quite different from
what we are accustomed to consider damage to property.7 The courts
above mentioned which denied the universality of the rule as to
political matters and elections are among the few in this class of cases
that have placed their action squarely on the ground of irreparable
injury to the public weal. This, it is believed, is sufficient reason for
the intervention of equity whether damage is threatened to property
or not.
8
In .the second place, courts are cautious in interfering with an
officer of the political branch of the government, and that is what
restraint of an election usually means. This, it is said, attacks the
foundation of our governmental system-the three-fold separation of
powers.9 None of the cases analyze carefully, however, the possibilities
of the situation. It is submitted that the acts which are sought to be
restrained may be of three kinds: (i) acts of the executive within its
discretion under power given by the constitution or some valid law;
(2) acts beyond the power given by law or constitution; and (3) acts
in pursuance of duties charged by invalid laws or invalid constitutional
provisions. Cases involving any one of these classes are cited indis-
criminately in cases involving any other one.10 As to the first class
113 N. E. 581 (mandamus used like injunction in state that originally had no
courts of equity). The usual distinction between mandamus and injunction in
similar cases is extremely well explained in State v. Lord (1896) 28 Ore. 498,
51o, 43 Pac. 471, 474. But it is submitted thit in the Michigan and Massachusetts
cases cited the distinction does not apply, and that an equitable remedy in
effect was employed.
' (1915) 28 HAxv. L. REv. 343, 445.
'Cf. Lynch v. Knight (i86I) 9 H. L. Cas. 577, *592.
'See CO-MMENT (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 779; cf. (1920) 29 ibid., 344.
1 See (1914) 14 COL. L. REV. 243 in accord. But cf. (1914) 28 HARv. L. REV.
369.
'Cf. Green v. Mills (1895, C. C. A. 4 th) 69 Fed. 852, per Holmes, J.; cf. Green,
Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 369.
10 See in the instant case, which apparently falls under class 2, citations of
Walton v. Develing (1871) 61 Ill. 2Ol (class ) ; Harris v. Shryock (1876) 82
Ill. i19 (class 2) ; and Spies v. Byers (1919) 287 Ill. 627, 122 N. E. 841 (class 3).
The language of the opinion in Walton v. Develing is imported bodily into that
of the instant case at several points.
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there can be no conflict. The judiciary cannot interfere with or review
the lawful discretion of the co6rdinate branches of government.11
Naturally this principle should make the courts careful in doing any-
thing which seems so to interfere. Acts within this lawful discretion
are to 'be clearly distinguished from purely ministerial acts on the
one hand,12 and from acts ultra vires (class 2) on the other. If any
court seeks .to restrain or review acts within this first class, its order
or decree is not merely. subject to reversal, but is probably void.13 To
allow interference here may well be said to attack the foundation of
our system.
Equity clearly has power to restrain acts ultra vires and acts in
pursuance of an invalid law when property rights are immediately
threatened, whether an election is involved or not. In this way the
constitutionality of many laws is passed upon.14 So far as the Presi-
dent is concerned, it would be highly impolitic, of course, for any
court to issue orders of any kind to him, and obviously it would have
no power of enforcement beyond moral suasion.' 5 The policy does
not extend with quite the same force to the governor of a state, it
would seem.' With reference to subordinate officers and boards
courts have no hesitation in acting.
Where the rights of the complainant personally are not threatened
by official acts ultra vires, complaint to administrative superiors for
punishment for breach of duty is the usual and adequate procedure.
But why deny equity the power to prevent such acts? It is quite
possible for situations to arise in which the administrative superiors
refuse to see that the law is being broken, or in which the delay neces-
sary to take the ordinary steps means irreparable injury to the public.
Equity has the power and has used it in such cases.17 The fact that
it is an election that the officer illegally threatens to hold should only
"Determinations of law, however, can be reviewed. See COMMENT (I918)
27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 550.
"Failure to perform these may be remedied specifically by mandamus. See
(I915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6o4. For errors of judgment in the exercise of
iliscretion, however gross, there is no remedy but appeal to a reviewing authority,
if there be one, assuming that the law authorizing the discretion is valid. For
mandamus to force the holding of an election, see State v. Commissioners (1914)
93 Kan. 405, I44 Pac. 241.
" Walton v. Develing, supra; Mississippi v. Johnson (1866) 71 U. S. 475;
Morgan v. County Court (1903) 53 W. Va. 372, 44 S. E. i8z
', See cases cited Am. Dig., Dec. Injunction, sec. 85; Cent. Dig. Injunction,
secs. 155, i56. On the subject of suits against the state in general, see 44
L. R. A. (N. S.) x89, note.
"Cf. Mississippi v. Johnson, supra.
" Courts have occasionally controlled the actions of the governor, though
-there is considerable conflict on this point. See State v. Cunningham, supra
(restraint of board of election commissioners, of which governor was head);
(913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 97.
"People v. Tool, supra.
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make the court careful, and not deprive it of power. A privilege and
power to vote at an election which is sure to be subsequently held void
are not particularly sacred. The mere word "election," however,
in the principal case and in two previous Illinois cases"' led the court
to lose sight of the malfeasance in office, and to deny itself power to
pass on the merits. Clearly restraint of an officer acting thus may be
justifiable interference with the political branch of the government.
The exact status of acts performed under a statute subsequently held
to be invalid forms a very interesting problem in itself. 19 Those in
which we are here interested, acts connected with elections, seem to be
called in question frequently, when no property rights are involved,
in cases of apportionment of representation, or gerrymandering. In
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham,20 the secretary of state was
restrained from holding an election under an apportionment statute
that was held unconstitutional. The court said, "The legislature that
passed the act is not as assailed, nor is its constitutional province
invaded. . . . The determination may have a political effect, but
that would not necessarily make the question determined a political
instead of a judicial question." The Illinois court on the other hand
in Fletcher v. Tuttle," refused this same relief because the rights
(sic) involved, namely to vote, to. be a candidate, and to have the
election called and held under a valid law were political and not the
subject of equity jurisdiction. The question came up again under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, when it was attempted
to restrain an election under registration statutes that effectually
deprived the negro of his power to vote. Chief Justice Fuller and
Justice Holmes in the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the bill,
2 2
the Chief Justice on the ground that no right of property was threat-
ened with infringement,2 and Justice Holmes flatly on the basis of
non-interference with the other departments. The circuit judge who
filed an opinion in an identical case,2 ' after this last decision, but
before seeing the opinion, seems to have furnished a fairly adequate
' 8Harris v. Shryock, supra; Thompson v. Mahoney (9o7) 136 Ill. App. 403.
19Cf. Buck v. Eureka (1895) iog Calif. 504, 42 Pac. 243; State v. Goodvin
(18g8) 123 N. C. 697,31 S. E. 22I. Cf. COMMENT (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
592.
to Supra.
(f894.) IS' Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683. Matter of Reynolds (igi) 202 N. Y. 43o,
96 N. E. 87, accord. In Illinois it. required one more year to find out that the
apportionment law was valid. People v. Thompson (895) i55 Ill. 451, 4o N. F.
307.
, Green v. Mills, supra.
"The leading New York case went on this ground, in spite of the importance
of the public interest involved. Schieffelin v. Komfort (914) 212 N. Y. 520,
io6 N. E. 675. This case was eminently one for a declaratory judgement; cf.
Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment (igi8) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I, io5;
and COMMENT (I920) 29 ibid., 545.
"Gowdy v. Green (i895, C. C. S. C.) 69 Fed. 865.
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answer to this entire argument. "I think that the rights as claimed
by the plaintiffs as citizens of the United States and of South Carolina
have a property value of the highest and most sacred character. These
rights it is admitted the plaintiffs are deprived of; but it is insisted
they have adequate remedies at law, and that equity therefore cannot
entertain their complaints. I regret very much that the Court of
Appeals did not indicate the character of the remedy at law. I regret
also that I am unable after thorough investigation to find it."
It is submitted therefore that equity powers in matters of a political
nature should be tested, not by the property interest involved or by
the presence or absence of an election or of political rights, so-called,
in the case, -but by the character of the act to be enjoined. Once it is
determined that the act is ultra vires, or that the law may perhaps
be invalid, the case should be considered on the merits. The decision
would then depend on the balance between the policy against inter-
ference with the political branch or with the freedom of elections, and
the importance of the injury tlreatened to the public.
STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE DEBTS
The theory that a corporation is a complete legal entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders is receiving some severe blows. The
recent case of Louisville & N. R. R. v'. Nield (1919, Ky.) 216 S. W.
62 illustrates the point nicely. The plaintiff was the sole creditor of
a corporation of which the defendant was the sole stockholder. In
effect the bill alleged that the defendant, with notice of the plaintiff's
claim, had wrongfully taken the corporate assets and so left the cor-
poration insolvent, though not legally dissolved. The defendant
demurred because no judgment had been secured against the corpora-
tion at law and because the corporation had not been joined as a party
defendant. The court overruled the demurrer, saying that "the
defendant had literally swallowed the corporation whole" and thereby
placed himself under a duty to pay its debts.
It has been an established principle of corporation law that the cor-
poration is under the primary duty to pay its own debts. So the rule,
just as in the case of any debtor, would logically require a judgment
at law to establish the debt as a c6ndition precedent to the filing of a
cfeditor's bill in equity.' In many states both the law and the equity
action may be prosecuted in one suit by bringing both parties in as
defendants.2 But in no state, in the absence of statute, will the mere
allegation of the insolvency of an individual debtor support a creditor's
. Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank (1893) 148 U. S. 603, 13 Sup. Ct. 69x;
Gabbert v. Union Gas & Traction Co. (I9O9) I4O Mo. App. 6, 123 S. W. io24.
2 Wofford-Fain Co. v. Hampton (1917, N. C.) 92 S. E. 612; Fulton Auto
Supply Co. v. Sullivan (1918) r48 Ga. 347, 96 S. E. 875.
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bill.3  There must first be a judgment at law against the debtor, to
establish the debt.' The individual remains the principal debtor. But
the court in the principal case very justly recognized that the defendant
was the only person interested in the corporation. In legal theory the
corporation and the defendant were distinct,5 but in fact the defendant
was the corporation. It was really the defendant's debt which was
being collected. The court therefore refused to put the plaintiff to
the useless expense of first reducing his claim to a judgment against
the corporation. 6
Though this distinction between corporate and individual debtors
appears at first *sight to show merely a difference of procedure, it is
submitted that there is an important underlying difference of sub-
stance.7  When C contracts with the A corporation, what are, in fact,
the resulting legal relations? Is it enough to indulge the fiction and
say that the contract is between C and A, and that X, Y and Z, the
stockholders of A, are only incidentally concerned? For ordinary
purposes that explanation may suffice, but whenever the matter has
come to a test the courts have shown themselves ready to ignore the
legal entity completely-as in the principal case.8  Admittedly X, Y
and Z own the entire beneficial interest in the corporate assets subject
to C's right to payment. As a fact, is not a corporation a mere form
to enable X, Y and Z to do business with certain combined assets as if
'(for many purposes) they were one person, and to limit their liability
on such dealing to the amount of those assets? Then C's duty is to
render certain services to the A corporation (which is X, Y, and Z)
in return for the promise of X, Y and Z to pay for the same out of
the combined assets held by them as the A corporation. For most
purposes, such as holding "title" to property, contracting, committing
torts in the course of business, or suing and being sued in ordinary
cases, the corporation should and can conveniently be treated as if it
were a legal entity. Such convenience of treatment (together with
limitation of liability) is the whole purpose of incorporation. But a
'Huselton & Co. v. Dure (191o, Ch.) 77 N. J. Eq. 437, 77 Atl. 1042; Estes
v. Wilcox (1876) 67 N. Y. 264; Gray'.s Harbor Commercial Co. v. Fifer (1917)
97 Wash. 380, 166 Pac. 770.
"Hardy v. Hardy (1915) 143 Ga. 703, 86 S. E. 78o; Drahos v. Kopesky (1906)
132 Iowa, 497, lO9 N. W. iO2i; Union Credit Ass'n v. Corson (1915) 77 Ore.
361, 149 Pac. 318.
'A corporation is not dissolved, even if it becomes insolvent and all the stock
is held in one name. Elliot v. Sullivan (1911) 156 Mo. App. 496, 137 S. W.
287. Contra, Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co. (1886) 65 Md. 428.
'Accord, Garetson Hilton Lumber Co. v. Hinson (1914) 69 Ore. 6o5, 14o
Pac. 633; Schneider v. Johnson (1912) 164 Mo. App. 639, 147 S. W. 538 (unpaid
subscription).
I For a careful exposition of this view, especially in its relation to the conflict
of laws, see Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corpora-
tion Debts (igog) 9 CoL. L. Rxv. 285.
*Wormser, Piercing the Velt of Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 496.
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conscious recognition of the real relations between the parties is
necessary to clarify the principles underlying an important class of
cases where the courts have on one pretext or another ignored the
legal entity.
Take the principal case9 as an. example. C is the sole creditor of
the A corporation of which, let us assume, in order to reduce the case
to its simplest form, X was the sole stockholder at the time C's claim
arose.'0 Then X promised to pay C from those of his assets which he
held in the name of the A corporation. C agreed to accept that
promise, so limited, as consideration for his services. Now clearly,
if X through his control of the A corporation chooses to remove
those assets from the corporation and to hold them in his individual
name, he does not thereby, alter or extinguish the scope of his duty
to C. So long as X maintained the existence of A as a separate
entity, C would indeed look to it first for payment. C might ("recog-
nizing the entity") have treated the transfer as a fraudulent con-
veyance and, after reducing his claim to judgment against the cor-
poration, have had the transfer set aside in equity to the extent of
his claim. But the court in the principal case simply regarded the
situation as one where the principal debtor had in his own hands the
funds promised to the creditor. There were no other rights involved.
So the court ignored the fictional entity and simply required the
defendant, directly, to fulfill his duty. Any other decision would have
been a blind worship of form.
If on the other hand the A corporation had transferred its assets
to a second person W, or a second corporation B, in which X the
stockholder of A had no interest whatever, the foregoing situation
would be sharply contrasted. Of course if the sale was bonca fide and
for value, C has not been injured, because there has been a fair return
made for thd property withdrawn."' C takes the chance that corporate
assets may be depleted by accident or by poor judgment in the course
of ordinary business transactions, and has no power to control the
corporation's business policy. But if the transfer to B were fraudulent,
then the principles applicable to fraudulent conveyances by individuals
should apply. X as stockholder is still under a primary liability to
be divested pro tanto of his interest in the assets remaining in the A
corporation by C's exercise of his power to collect. But as X has
not himself taken the assets transferred, C has no power to bring a
creditor's bill against him. In such case there is no reason to question
the sufficiency of A as a legal entity. Suit must first be brought
according to the usual rule relating to fraudulent conveyances against
'Louisville & N. R. R. v. Nield, supra.
The same principle would seem to hold without relation to the number of
stockholders. And on the sale of a share of stock the new stockholder assumes,
in the main, his predecessor's liabilities.
"Barrie v. United Rys. of St. Louis (19o7) 125 Mo. App. 96, i02 S. W. io78.
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the A corporation, which represents X, in order to establish the debt,
and then in equity to set aside the conveyance.
12
Another distinct type of case is that where the stockholders X, Y
and Z of corporation A organize a new corporation B and "transfer"
all their assets held in the A corporation to B in return for which
they take stock in B. There have been several ways of treating the
case with the common result of placing B under a duty to pay A's
debts to the extent of the assets gratuitously .transferred.18 One theory
is that the transaction has merely been a change of name.14 The court
thereby simply ignores the fact that in theory there are two separate
legal entities and it permits A's creditors to recover of B either in
law or in equity.' 5 By the majority view the assets are regarded as a
"trust fund for the benefit of creditors" and B through the agency
of the common officers has notice of A's debts. It then, in taking all
A's assets and issuing its stock in return therefor among A's stock-
holders, is a party to a breach of trust" Yet it has often been decided
that the assets of 9L corporation are not a technical trust fund.'
7  It
is not a breach of trust for the corporation to transfer its assets to
third parties in good faith and for value. And in the absence of statute
such a sale is good even if the transferee has notice of the corpora-
tion's insolvency.' There should be no more reason for calling funds
from which a corporation's creditors are to be paid a "trust fund"
than the funds of any other debtor. Courts resort to the doctrine
to explain their judgment against B more plausibly. In fact they
recognize that it is the stockholders who should and so are held to
answer for the debt by a judgment against B. Were the stockholders
not the same in each corporation the transaction would be treated as
a sale.19
It will not do merely to say that courts in the above case have made
an exception where necessary to avoid fraud. Undoubtedly they do
that but such an explanation offers no index as to when they would
I Coleman v. Hagey (1913) 252 Mo. 1o2, i58 S. W. 829; Sharpies Co. v.
Harding Creamery Co. (907) 78 Neb. 795, 111 N,. W. 783.
1 There seems nio question but that the second corporation is only liable to
the extent. of the assets received. Johinson v. United Rys. of St. Louis (1912)
247 Mo. 326, 152 S. W. 362.
"'Auston v. Tecumseh Nat. Bank (1896) 49 Neb. 412, 68 N. W. 628; Blanc
v. Paymaster Min. Co. (1892) 95 Calif. 524, 30 Pac. 765.
15A judgment may be secured at law against either or both corporations.
Wolff v. Shreveport Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. (1916) 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789.
"Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. McFarland's Adm'r (913) 156 Ky.
44, x6o S. W. 798; Jennings, Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. (913) 128 Tenn.
23, 159 S. W. 1o88.
It Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co (1893) 150 U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127.
"Hagemann v. Southern Electric Ry. (1907) 202 Mo. 249, 100 S. W. 1o8x.
The reason is that without such a rule there would be enormous difficulty in
realizing on the assets of the corporation.
" Sharpies Co. v. Harding Creamery Co., supra.
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consider another situation within the exception. The decisions mark
two facts as operative: (i) that of corporate assets and (2) that of
identity of stockholders. Where the same stockholders who may be
said to have promised to pay C from their combined assets held in the
name of the A corporation now hold those assets in the name of the
B corporation leaving A insolvent C has uniformly been allowed to
recover of B. The situation is the same as in the principal case,
except that here the primary duty of the stockholders X, Y and Z
to pay can be enforced by "recognizing" the B corporation and suing
X, Y and Z under its name. It makes no difference to C's rights in
what manner X, Y and Z choose to keep the assets payable to C.
When the A and B corporations, however, are both maintained as
going concerns, a,-more difficult situation is presented. It is of course
clear that A and B may be entirely distinct businesses though managed
by the same directors and owned by the same stockholders. And a sale
made by A to B in good faith and for value cannot be set aside by
A's creditors.20 And if the control of A has not been exercised in
the interest of B, no right of action is given A's creditors against B.2,
On the other hand, where the policy of A has been controlled in B's
interest with the result that A's assets have been diminished, it has
been held -that a creditor of A might subject B's assets to the payment
of his claims in a bankruptcy proceeding.22 Here, although there had
been no transfer of tangible assets, B had received an equivalent bene-
fit from the control of A in B's favor. The transactions have the same
effect as if the stockholders had transferred their assets held in A
to B. The case is thus analogous to the preceding instance.
So far the question has been in this type of case whether the A
corporation was in fact -the "agent," "dummy," or "subsidiary" of
the B corporation. It has therefore been difficult to determine just
when the A corporation might properly be considered "swallowed."
Depending on the answer to that question it has followed that either
the B corporation was under a duty to pay the whole of A's debts or
under no duty at all. It would seem that this method of inquiry raises
an incorrect and misleading question. Even though the stockholders
and directors and officers in A are identical with those in B, the right
of A's creditor is only to be paid out of A's assets. If that corpora-
tion has been managed in its own interest and fails from purely
economic reasons, there is no justification for holding the B corpora-
tion. If. A has been controlled in B's interest, then B should be under
a duty, but only to the extent to which A's assets have been diminished
as a result of that control. Of course if the control has been complete
and wholly in the interest of B, it might be both difficult and, as a
"Atkinson v. Western Development Syndicate (i915) x7o Calif. 503, i5o Pac.
36o.
'In re Watertown Paper Co. (igog, C. C. A. 2d) 169 Fed. 252.
"In re Muncie Pulp Co. (xgoS, C. C. A. 2d) 139 Fed. 546.
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matter of policy, unnecessary to establish the extent of A's loss.
22  It
would seem, however, -that such matters as separate account books,
identity of directors, etc., are only ev'idential facts to establish 'the
extent of the control in the interest of the dominant corporation.
24
Another type of case which offers from another angle a striking
illustration of the courts' willingness to disregard -the fictional entity
is the recent case of Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry. (1919, C. C. A.
9 th) 259 Fed. 183. The United States owned all the stock in the
defendant corporation. It was held that because the government
could not be sued without its permission, the plaintiff could not main-
tain his action of tort against the corporation.25 The case would seem
to bear out the theory that a corporation is merely an association of
stockholders doing business as if they were one person. And it lends
indirect support to the statement. that the real parties to a contract
with a corporation (as to a tort committed by it) are the persons con-
cerned and the stockholders, 26 whose duty to pay is limited to the
extent of the corporate assets.
Although all the courts in the foregoing cases profess to follow the
legal entity theory in its entirety merely "making an exception in the
particular case to secure evident justice," it is submitted that they
have really recognized an entirely different principle.2 7  If it be con-
ceded that a creditor has a right, not against the corporation, but
against the stockholder, to be paid from the stockholder's interest in
the assets held by him in the name of that corporation, practically all
decisions may be explained without turnings and twistings of theory.
Although, the case is more complicated where one corporation has
been merged or consolidated with one owned by entirely different
interests, the principle remains the same.28  The creditors' original
' Where the B corporation holds all the stock in the A corporation and really
conducts its own business through A, it is probably unnecessary to determine
A's loss in most cases. Consequently if B loans A money, B should not be
allowed to share as a creditor where the money loaned is less than the loss
occasioned A's assets. S. G. V. Co. of Delaware v. S. G. V. Co. of Pennsylvania
(Pa. i919) IO7 Atl. 721. The court in that case, however, simply confused the
two corporations.
' 092o) 4 MINN. L. Rnv. 2I9 discusses these relations as evidence but does
not make this distinction.
I This point is by no means settled but seems to be well decided. See contra,
Panama R. R. v. Curran (I919g, C. C. A. 5th) 256 Fed. 768.
"For an instance of the many cases where the stockholders have been frus-
trated in their attempt to avoid a contract duty by organizing a second corpora-
tion see George v. Rollins (I913) 176 Mich. I44, 142 N. W. 337.
'Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Consti-
tutional Law (ipi8). Freund, The Legal Natlre of Corporations (1898).
I It has been intimated that as to those stockholders common to both corpora-
tions their liability remains unchanged, while as to the new stockholders it is
the ordinary case of receiving a conveyance in fraud of creditors. Montgomery
Web Co. v. Dienelt (i8go) I33 Pa. 585, ig Atl. 428.
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right is enforced, wherever the stockholder has placed the assets.
The reason given may be that the one corporation has been left a
mere "shell," or is a "dummy," or has been "literally swallowed
whole." But the fact is that the legal entity fiction will be disregarded
when necessary to enforce the stockholder's duty according to his
true contract. However to go farther and disregard the corporate
entity seemingly at will would be an unjustifiable blow at the basis
of corporation law. It is submitted that it would tend -toward accuracy
of thought and jijstice to recognize more frankly the exact relations
of the parties.
EVIDENCE OF INTENTION AS REBUTTING WAYS OF NECESSITY
Can the presumption of a grant, or of a reservation, of an easement
of necessity be rebutted by proof of an oral agreement of the parties
to the contrary? In giving effect to a written instrument, even where
a writing is required by law, oral conversations are admissible to
"rebut an equity."' This old and very ambiguous doctrine, though
sometimes construed to relate merely to constructive or resulting
trusts, 2 has nevertheless been extended to a rather miscellaneous group
of legal presumptions.3 Clearly, however, not all legal presumptions
may be overriden by this kind of evidence. 4 Upon what principles are
conclusions arising out of the application of legal presumptions to
written instruments admitted to or excluded from the protection of
the "parol evidence" rule?
In the case of Orpin v. Morrison,; a deed was delivered embracing
land so situated as to give rise, under ordinary circumstances, to a
way of necessity across the land of the grantor. In litigation involving
the existence of this "right of way," the alleged servient owner intro-
duced without objection evidence of an oral understanding that no such
easement should be granted. Subsequently the court was'requested to
rule that this evidence could not be considered. It was held that the
evidence, once admitted, was relevant to prove the actual intentions of
the parties as a means of iebutting the presumption.
It seems clear, notwithstanding a contrary intimation in the opinion,6
that we have here no middle ground between the absolute irrelevancy
and the absolute admissibility of the evidence in question and that the
latter, if objectionable at all, could not possibly be cured by the failure
to object to its introduction. We need not enter into the by no means
1Jarman, Wills (6th ed. Sweet, 19io) 497; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence (898) 437-441; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. 2475; Langham
v. Sanford (i8rr, Eng. Ch.) i7 Ves. 435.2 Hughes v. Wilkinson (1860) 35 Ala. 453, 463. 'Thayer, op. cit., 437 ff.
'Hall v. Hill (841, Ir.) I Dr. & War. 94.
' (i9x8) 23o Mass. 529, 120 N. E. 183. 'Ibid., 532.
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settled controversy whether there exists a technical rule of evidence
applicable to oral conversations when offered for strictly interpretative
purposes.7 However this may be, the rule which prohibits the use of
such evidence to contradict or supplement a writing is generally recog-
nized as one of substantive law.' In the present case, where the
question was merely one of rebutting a legal presumption, the problem
was manifestly one of contradiction and not of interpretation. The
sole inquiry is, therefore, whether the legal conclusion thus contra-
dicted was or was not within the protection of the-parol evidence rule.
If so, the conversation offered in contradiction was as irrelevant as
if in direct conflict with the specific language of the instrument. If
not, the conversation was not merely relevant, but perfectly good
evidence within a well-established rule.9
How should the issue of relevancy thus raised be decided? If it
was correctly resolved in favor of the proof of the oral conversations,
this must be, as recognized in the principal case,10 by virtue of the
actual state of mind common -to the parties as disclosed by the evi-
dence, and not by reason of the oral agreement as an objectively
operative fact. Under the statute of frauds 1 the latter could not
operate independently of the deed to create or prevent the creation
of an easement. Could it be said that the deed was executed with
reference to the oral agreement, just as it must be presumed to have
been executed with reference to the physical situation and condition
of the property? To assert this would be virtually to incorporate the
oral agreement bodily into the deed in a manner which bears not the
slightest resemblance to an interpretation of the document. To pre-
vent such a proceeding is the very purpose of the parol evidence rule. 2
We are left then with the question as to the relevancy of the sub-
jective state of mind of the parties as a fact overriding the legal
presumption of a way of necessity. Is this a contradiction of the
"instrument" which is protected against contradiction by the parol
evidence rule?
Clearly the "instrument" within the meaning of this rule is much
more than the mere succession of written .words on the face of the
document. No one would contend, for example, that the principles of
syntaxc and the fixed canons of verbal usage are not within the pro-
tection of the rule to the same extent as the words themselves.
Furthermore it is well settled that genuine, as distinguished from
artificial, rules of construction applicable to particular parts of the
'See Thayer, op. cit., ch. x; 4 Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 2471; Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899) 12 HARv. L. REV. 417.
'Thayer, op. cit., 391-392; Mears v. Smith (I9o8) i99 Mass. 322, 85 N. E.
i65; Moody v. McCown (i865) 39 Ala. 586.
' See note x, supra. * 00rpin v. Morrison, supra, 532.
"Mass. Rev. Laws, I9o2, ch. 127, sec. 3.
See Doe v. Hubbard (85o) x5 Q. B. 227, 243.
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writing are essential elements of the instrument within the meaning
of the rule.13 This is undoubtedly equally true of many rules of pre-
sumption for ascertaining the interrelation of different provisions of
the document, or the relative efficacy of different elements in the text
in overriding apparent contradictions. Thus it is incredible that the
presumption that monuments control distances in the specification of
a boundary could be rebutted by proof of an oral understanding to
the contrary, or that in the case of a bilateral contract embodied in a
writing complete on its face, the condifion implied in law of con-
temporaneous performance or readiness to perform could be excluded
by proof of an oral agreement that the reciprocal promises should
be strictly independent.
In fact the parol evidence rule would be devoid of meaning unless
it were held to debar an interference, by direct proof of actual inten-
tion, with the legal consequences arising from the language of the
instrument by a genuine process of interpretation. All these legal
consequences, however, ensue only by the extrinsic operation of law,
having for its purpose the giving effect to the instrument as a complete
and exclusive expression of intention. These legal effects are not, and
can not be, set forth with completeness in the text of the document.
The law is as truly construing the instrument as such, when it finds
an expression of intention in the general scheme of the document as
when it finds such an expression incorporated in an express provision.
In the case of a way of necessity, however, the legal presumption
is founded, not directly upon the express language or the structure
of the document, but upon the immediate physical consequences of
the grant which may or may not be ascertained without resort to
extrinsic proof. It may be suggested that we have in such a case no
longer a process of interpretation or construction, and that conse-
quently a presumption thus founded is in no sense a part of the instru-
ment within the protection of the parol evidence rule. But words in
instruments of grant are always used with a view to producing physical
effects through the changes in the legal relationship involved. How,
then, can the value of these words be appraised as an expression of
probable intention unless we look to the direct physical consequences
thus produced, within the range of the probable contemplation of the
parties? To examine the situation outside the deed to ascertain the
change which the deed has effected is not to discard the instrument but
to seek a more complete rational understanding of it as something
dynamically operative rather than a mere series of formal expressions.
If, therefore, such an examination discloses as a direct consequence
of the grant a parcel deprived of direct access, and if the law finds
in this situation a rational basis for an inference of intention sufficiently
cogent to give rise to a presumption of a way of necessity, is not this
"Hall v. Hill, supra; 2 Taylor, Evidence (gth ed. 1897) sec. 1231.
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legal conclusion well within the range of a genuinely interpretative
process of inference, which starts with the language of the document
and which adheres throughout to the purpose of appraising this
language as an expression of probable intention ?14
The presumption of a way of necessity is founded -upon the ele-
mentary principle that the grant of a thing carries with it whatever is
reasonably necessary to its enjoyment.15  It has therefore vastly
greater genuinely probative force than those legal conclusions which
are admittedly subject, under the authorities, to rebuttal by direct
evidences of actual intention. Thus conclusions based upon technically
equitable considerations are thus rebuttable,16 but these by their very
nature exclude the element of probable intention. The implied war-
ranty of title in the law of sales has been held to be within the same
rule, 7 but this is by the better opinion, deemed to proceed upon an
essentially quasi-contractual disregard of probable intention. So too
statutory presumptions, such as that of the inadvertence of the omis-
sion of a lineal descendant from a will, are within the rule,' 8 but these
manifestly ride rough-shod over truly interpretative considerations.
There remains the "artificial" class of presumptions, such as courts
of equity have sometimes adopted, often 'borrowing them from the civil
law, as makeshifts for the solution of difficulties created by the absence
of genuine probative data.'0 Whether a repeated testamentary gift
was intended to be cumulative or substitutional,2 0 whether an executor
1"The deed of the grantor as much creates the way of necessity as it does
the way by grant; the only difference between the two is that one is granted
in expiress words, and the other only by implication." Nichols v. Luce (1834,
Mass.) 24 Pick. lO2, lO4.
"Schmidt v. Quinn (1884) 136 Mass. 575 ("a right of way is presumed to be
granted; otherwise the grant would be practically useless."); Doten v. Bartlett
(19io) io7 Me. 351, 78 Atl. 456 ("it is not to be presumed that the parties
intended the grantee to have no beneficial enjoyment of the estate."); Higbee
Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co. (1911) 78 N. J. Eq. 434, 79 Atl. 326
("In such a case the right of way is a necessary incident to the grant, for
without it thie grant would be useless; the grant is necessarily for the beneficial
use of the grantee and the way is necessary to the use."); Collins v. Prentice
(0842) I5 Conn. 39.
"Mann v. Executors (1814, N. Y.) I Johns. Ch. 231; Faylor v. Faylor
(1902) 136 Calif. 92, 68 Pac. 482 (resulting trust) ; Thurston v. Arnold (1876)
43 Iowa, 43 (equitable rule that time is not of the essence of the contract).
"Miller v. Van Tassel (1864) 24 Calif. 458.
"it re Atwood's Estate (1896) 14 Utah, I, 45 Pac. 1O36; Buckley v. Gerard
(1877) 123 Mass. 8.
""The anomalous case of what are called 'presumptions' of law are, in
reality, rules of construction derived from the civil law, which, having obtained
a lodgment in English law, but being disapproved of, have been allowed to
retain their own antidote in the shape of the capability of being rebutted by
parol evidence, which (in common, however, with other rules of construction)
they possessed in the system from which they were originally derived."
Hawkins, Wills (2d Am. ed. 1885) ix.
"Trimmer v. Bayne (18o2, Eng. Ch.) 7 Ves. 508.
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given a specific legacy was thereby intended to be excluded from the
residue,21 whether a bequest by a debtor to his creditor was intended
as a payment of the debt,22 -these are all questions upon which the
intrinsic bases for inference of intention are meagre and nicely bal-
anced.23  The presumptions applied to their solution being artificial
and exotic, it is not surprising that, at a time when the parol evidence
rule was still in a rudimentary stage, rebuttal by direct proof of
subjective intention was admitted.
It must be conceded, under the authorities, that evidence of the
prospective use of the granted premises is admissible to show whether,
in view of such prospective use, an existing mode of access is sufficient
to prevent the operation of the presumption. 24 This, however, is sug-
gestive of the usual case of bringing the subjective intention to the
relief of an intrinsically ambiguous situation, rather than a use of
the evidence in the rebuttal of the legal presumption.
In the law of conveyancing, in which the statute of frauds and the
parol evidence rule coperate to produce a system of transfers in
permanent and accessible form, and in which the systems of recording
render the results of an examination of the record both indispensable
and decisive in important real estate transactions, it is of especial
importance that legal principles should be applicable to matters of
record with a minimum of resort to transient and untrustworthy evi-
dences of subjective intention. The relaxation of the parol evidence
rule in the principal case, though supported by some authority,25 is
believed to be contrary both to immediate practical considerations and
to sound principle.
INJURY BY VOLUNTARY ACT OF COEMPLOYEE UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACTS
The decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of'Errors in the case
of Marchiatello v. Lynch Realty Company (i919, Conn.) io8 Atl. 799,
Ulrich v. Litchfield (1742, Eng. Ch.) 2 Atk. 372.
' Wallace v. Pomfret (i8O5, Eng. Ch.) ix Ves. 542. But see Hall v. Hill,
supra, 122, 123.
"'It (the testator's mere extrinsic ifitention) comes in as a mere incident
to-the 'equity,' as a ground of relief against the operation of a rule which
refuses its proper construction to the document." Thayer, op. cit., 439.
"Feoffees v. Proprietors (1899) I74 Mass. 572, 55. N. E. 462; Hildreth v.
Googins (2898) 9i Me. 227, 39 Atl. 550; Myers v. Dunn (1881) 49 Conn. 71;
Kingsley v. Gouldsborough Co. (1894) 86 Me. 279, 29 At. IO74.
' Golden v. Rupard (19o4) 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2125, 8o S. W. 162, erroneously
relying upon Lebus v. Boston (i899) IO7 Ky. 98, 52 S. W. 956, in which, how-
ever, the oral agreement offered operated as an admission of the existence of
access at the time of the grant. See Jann v. Standard Cement Co. (1913) 54
Ind. App. 22r, 222, 2o2 N. E. 872, 874; contra, Kruegel v. Nitschmann (1897)
15 Tex. Civ. App. 641, 40 S. W. 68.
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invites an examination of the cases arising under workmen's compen-
sation acts in whicl an employee has been injured by the voluntary
act of a coEmployee.1 In this recent Connecticut case the foreman
of some construction work-was also paymaster and had in his pos-
session for'his personal protection an automatic pistol. An office
boy, fifteen years of age, found it on the desk where it was usually
kept and picked it up to examine. While so doing it was discharged
and the bullet penetrated a board partition separating the foreman's
office from the next room and struck the night watchman who was
engaged in the performance of his duties. Death resulted from the
wound and the court awarded compensation holding that the cause of
death grew out of a risk to which the deceased.was exposed by the
condition of his employment.
2
The problem here raised is closely akin to that presented in the
case of an assault upon an employee by a co~mployee or by the "practi-
cal joke" or "horseplay." In each case the injury results from a
voluntary act of an employee who departs from his usual duties to
gratify some personal desire.3 It is generally stated that an injury
resulting directly from a wilfully tortious or sportive act of a fellow
employee who has departed temporarily from his employment is not
within that class of injuries provided for in the statutes.4  This rule,
however, does not apply to injuries received by one in authority at
the hands of an aggrieved subordinate, the risk of such an injury being
considered as incidental to the exercise of authority. And so a fore-
man in charge of a section gang," a bookkeeper employed to check up
and collect for shortages, a headwaiter with power to discharge7 and
even a school teacher," have been adjudged to be exposed to this
'The contest in these cases "is over the construction of the limiting phrase,
arising "out of and in the course of" the employment. This double limitation is
common to almost all compensation acts.
'An injury arises "out of the" employment when it occurs in the course of
the employment and is a natural and necessary incident or consequence of it or
the conditions and exposure surrounding it. Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. (1915) go'Conn. 3o3, 97 At. 320; McNicols Case (913) 215 Mass. 497, io2
N. E. 697.
"In the assault cases, he is seeking to gratify his feeling of anger or hatred;
in the "horseplay" cases, it is his sportive instinct or his playfulness; in the
instant case, it was his curiosity.
"Kiser, Workmen's Compensation Acts (917) 79; Armitage v. Lancashire &
Y. R. R. [I9O2] 2 K. B. 178; Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic (i9i6) 162
Wis. 341, x56 N. W. 143.
' Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Calif. 686, 15i Pac. 398;
Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Commission (1916) 9I Wash. 588, 158 Pac. 256.
'Polar Ice & Fuel Co. v. Mulray.(1918, Ind. App.) i i N. E. 149.
'Cranney's Case (igig, Mass.) 122 N: E. 266, (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
839.
"Trim School Board v. Kelly [1914] A. C. 667. But no recovery was allowed
where a school teacher was assaulted by a stranger. State v. District Court
(1x18) I4o Minn. 47o, I68 N. W. 555.
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risk of assault as incidental to the exercise of their authority. But
when both the assaulted one and the assailant are of equal rank, com-
pensation has been denied even though the dispute giving rise to
the injury was in regard to the manner in which the work was being
done; unless, indeed, knowledge of the quarrelsome disposition of the
assailant can be "imputed" to the employerY There is much authority,
however, allowing compensation in this latter case irrespective of the
employer's knowledge, the assault being regarded as originating in
the employment since it is the gratification of some passion conceived
within the relationship between the two employees which exists only
because of the employment.1 0 An assault to satisfy merely an ugly
disposition is also taken out of the operation of the general rule by
knowledge of the employer of the character of the employee.1
The "horseplay" and "curiosity" cases arising from frolicsome and
meddling dispositions of employees resemble this latter class of assault
cases,1 2 and the same subjective test of knowledge has been applied.
The causative danger is not peculiar to the employment.1 3 Hence it
has been held that only when the employer knows of the playfulness
of the employee can his victim, who has confined himself faithfully
to his duties, recover.14 In such -a case only, the danger becomes an
incident to the conditions under which the employee performs his
duties.1 5 So in the principal case, thE court allowed recovery on the
ground that the employer had such knowledge.
1 6
But knowledge of what facts must the employer have or be charged
with and why? When it is considered -that the raison d' tre of this
Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. (I918) 92 Conn. 382, lO3 At. 115,
following Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis (1917) 64 Ind. App. 227, 115 N. E.
676; (I918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 965.
" 0Heitz v. Ruppert (1916) 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750; M'Intyre v. Rodger
& Co. (19o3, Ct. Sess.) 41 Scot. L. Rep. 1o7; Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial
Commission (918) 285 Ill. Y1, i2o N. E. 530; Mueller v. Klingman (1gig, Ind.
App.) T25 N. E. 464.
SMcNicols' Case, supra; Mountain Ice Co. v. McNeil (1918, Ct. Err. & App.)
91 N. J. L. 528, 1o3 Atl. 184.
' There is no direct connection with the employment in either.
' Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, supra,
1 Stuart v. Kansas City (i918) io2 Kan. 307, 17, Pac. 913; Tarperr v. Weston-
Mott Co. (1918) 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857; Fighering v. Pillsbury (1916)
172 Calif. 69o, 158 PaC. 215; Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co.
(1916) 99 Neb. 321, I56 N. W. 509.
' 5State v. District Court (1918) i4o Minn. 75, 167 N. W. 283.
1 "The watchman was required to perform his duties under the existing con-
ditions of the employment, which were the presence of the boy and the pistol
where the watchman was obliged to work, the knowledge of the boy that the
pistol was in plain view and at hand, and the knowledge of the employer that
the boy was liable to handle the pistol and cause it to go off. The placing of the
pistol out of sight of the curious boy was within the power of the employer.
By his failure to exercise such control, the pistol in the place where Cote
found it became one of the conditions with which the watchman was obliged
to work."
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legislation was to ameliorate a social condition, it is difficult to under-
stand why so much stress should be placed upon this subjective test.
It would appear to be a clinging to the old common law-searc ing
for a fault which can be fastened upon the employer.17 But the sup-
posed purpose of this legislation was to impose "liability" regardless
of fault-a "liability" materially different from that under the common
law. In applying the subjective test, however, the liability is not
based on fault but on the conditions of the employment.18 But why
is the risk of assault, malicious or sportive, any less an incident of
modern employment when the employer does not know? The em-
ployer's knowledge, of itself, does not diminish the risk of the em-
ployee who is one of a large number brought together and necessarily
in constant intercourse with each other all of whom are possessed of
one' 9 or more of the multitudinous frailties of man. The risk of injury
by an employee who turns aside from his regular duties when moved
by his infirmity or imperfection may properly be considered an in-
evitable, however undesirable, result-an industrial risk incident to
the assembling of many men and a charge which industry was ex-
pected to bear under this beneficial legislation.20 The risk seems
"In the case at bar, the employer was not charged with the duty to see to it
that none of his employees assaulted any other one of them, either wilfully or
sportively. And when one made such an assault, he was guilty of the doing of
a negligent act as an individual tort-feasor, for which his employer was not
responsible." Hulley v. Moosbrugger (IM15, Ct. Err. & App.) 88 N. J. L. 161, i68,
95 Atl. ioo7, ioio. Cited with approval in Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber
& Coal Co. (1916) 99 Neb. 321, 326, i56 N. W. 509. It requires no citation
of authority that a master was not liable for the acts of a servant while on a
frolic of his own.
" "The test of this right of compensation under such acts is whether the
injury resulted from some peril incident to the employment . . . regardless
of whether such perils or surroundings involve negligence on the part of the
employer." "But his knowledge plus failure to remove makes it an element of
the conditions under which the employee was required to work." In re Loper
(917, Ind. App.) 116 N. E. 324, 325, (9,7) 27 YALE LAw JO RNAL, I42.
"We do not include, of course, malicious assaults to gratify some personal
grudge which one has conceived for the other outside of his relationship to
the other as coemployee.
" The argument of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Hulley .v. Moos-
brugger (1915) 87 N. J. L. IO3, 93 Atl. 79, seems unanswerable. "It is but
natural to expect them to deport themselves as young men and boys, replete
with the activities of life and health. For men of that age or even of maturer
years, to indulge in a moment's diversion from work to joke with or play a
prank upon a fellow workman is a matter of common knowledge to every
one who employs labor." It was repudiated, however, to follow English
authorities blindly. Hulley v. Moosbrugger (915, Ct. Err. & App.) 88 N. J. L.
16I, 95 At. ioo7. As the English authorities are now taking a more liberal
stand in defining the phrase "arising out of the employment," a modification
of the English doctrine on this point would not be entirely unexpected. See
Thorn v. Sinclair [I917] A. C. 127, (1917) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 143.
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fairly comparabfe to that of a machine with a hidden defect. So long
as the injured employee has not departed from his duties, it would
seem that he should be granted compensation under the acts.2'
The principal case is an illustration of the application of the sub-
jective test of knowledge in order to reach a correct result, but without
a clear analysis of the implications involved in the doctrine. Here the
employer was fairly chargeable with knowledge of the youth of the
co~mployee and perhaps also of the presence of the pistol since that
was known to a "number of employees." But there were no evidential
facts to show knowledge of the "character or habits" of the employee. 22
Hence knowledge of such facts is either imputed or unnecessary, i. e.,
it is not one of the operative facts creating the employer's duty to
pay compensation. This means, in either event, that among the
operative facts are the boy's age, disposition, etc., and the employer's
knowledge of the same is not included. This being so, the requirement
of knowledge is misleading and to give full effect in the future to the
desirable result reached in the case under discussion, it will be neces-
sary to discard entirely the pseudo-limitation attempted to be attached
to the principles involved.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT AN OFFER AS A TORT
It has been held the offeree's silence may be the equivalent of an
affirmative act of acceptance of an offer so as to make a binding
contract." Obviously such cases will be comparatively rare since the
offeror cannot be permitted to compel the offeree to take action to
avoid being bound by a contract unless the offeree's previous actions or
the circumstances of the parties justify. But may there not be a breach
"Swiff v. Industrial Commission (I919) 287 Ill. 564, 122 N. E. 796. This
position is strengthened by the fact that the same courts do allow recovery
where the injury is the indirect result of a practical joke. "How can his rights
be affected by the fact that the man who placed the can on the die says he did
so 'just to have some fun."' Knopp v. American Car Co. (1914) 186 Ill. App. 605.
"There can be no serious contention that the injury did not arise out of his
employment. Garls was required to present the slip given him at the window
of the office of plaintiff-in-error to receive his pay. Complying with this
regulation and standing in line waiting his turn he was jostled and thrown down
and injured through no fault of his own. It does not appear that he was
engaged in any jostling or "horseplay" .or that he in any way was responsible
for the injury he sustained." Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board (917)
277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128.
'See COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 44I, criticising Cole-McIntyre-
Norfleet Co. v. Holloway (i919, Tenn.) 214 S. W. 817. See also (1920) 33
HAv. L. R v. 595; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting
Legal Relations (19,7) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2oo; Ostman v. Lee (1917) 91
Conn. 731, io1 At. 23, (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 272; r Williston, Contracts
(x92o) sec. 91; r Page, Contracts (2d ed. i92o) sec. i6o.
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of duty for which the offeror may recover damages. where silence
results from the failure of the offeree's. agent to report to his principal
the offer he has solicited ?2
Now the question as to the existence of a duty to answer an offer
promptly may arise when, either the offer is made directly to the offeree
or when it is made to the offeree's agent. In the former case the
situation seems clearly one where each party knows that the offeree's
voliti6n is alone involved and hence mere delay in acting cannot be
considered a negligent breach-of duty. It may show an acceptance of
the contract,' it may be a breach of a collateral contract either to
accept or reject under certain conditions,
4 or it may, where the offer
has expired by lapse of time, demonstrate that the offer was not to
be accepted." Other than this apparently it can have no operative
effect.
Where the offer is made to the offeree's agent, however, there would
seem to be occasions where the agent's negligence is a breach of duty
which renders the principal liable in damages. The essential fact in the
creation of such a duty is not mere delay in acceptance, but is the
agent's failure to present the offer to his principal for acceptance within
a time considered proper under the facts of a particular case. Thus
in a well considered insurance case, application was made for life
insurance, the agent neglected to forward the-application, and the appli-
cant died before action was taken upon the application although accord-
ing to the company's ,usual course of business action should have been
taken before the death occurred. Recovery was had against the com-
pany on the theory that the agent was negligent.
6 The question arose in
the recent case of Four States Grocer Co. v. Wickendon (1919, Tex.)
'The negative answer seems to be suggested in (920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 595,
note 6.
' See note I, supra.
'Note (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 56I, criticising Evans Piano Co..v. Tully
(1917) II6 Miss. 267, 76 So. 833. -
5x 'Williston, op. cit., sec. 53.
'Duffle v. Bankers Life Ass'n (1913) i6o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1O87, approved
in (1913) 27 HARv. L. RFEV. 92. Semalso (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 647; (1913) 1I
MIcH. L. Rav. 6o6. In accord see Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins.
Ass'n (1912) 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 164, note: Wilken
v. Capitol Fire Ins. Co. (1916) 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021; contra, Nat'l Fire Ins.
Co. v. School District (I916) 122 Ark. 179, 182 S. W. 547; Dorman v. Conn. Fire
Ins. Co. (1914) 41 Okla. 549, 139 Pa. 262. Compare Meyer v. Central States
Fire Ins. Co. (1919, Neb.) 173 N. W. 578; Trask v. German Ins. Co. (1893)
53 Mo. App. 625; (1894) 58 Mo. App. 431. Some cases hold that failure to
communicate rejection of an application for insurance within a reasonable time
constitutes an acceptance, but the general rule is contrary. See cases collected
(1919) 33 HARV. L. Rav. 2o6, notes 40 and 41; 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 164; 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211. The Duffle case relies partly on the contention that
insurance is a public calling. Notwithstanding the ingenious argument by Pat-
terson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy (919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 216-
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217 S. W. IIO3, where one Joplin, agent for the grocer company, took
an order from Wickendon in October, 1916, for 3 bales of duck to
be shipped August I, 1917, "order taken subject to acceptance" of the
company. Joplin did not send the order to the company which first
heard of it when Wickendon wrote on July 5, "I917, asking that ship-
ment be made during the following month. Upon the company's
refusal to ship the goods at the price stated in the order Wickendon
sued for damages and recovered a verdict and judgment. The court
now reverses this judgment and orders judgment entered for the
company.
Wickendon had brought his action in two counts, one in ordinary
form for breach of contract, while in the other he stated the facts in
detail and alleged that he believed his order had been accepted as he
had no notice to the contrary until-July, 1917, that he failed to purchase
duck as he otherwise would and hag now been forced to purchase in
the open market at a much higher price and that the defendant is now
estopped from denying the making of a contract, because of the
negligence of its salesman and the plaintiff's belief that his order had
been received. The court in its opinion seems to concede the vital
element of the plaintiff's case, as it says that "Joplin personally owed
both his employer and his customer the duty to promptly transmit
orders taken in the course of his business." It then curiously bases its
decision for the company on the ground that Joplin's breach of duty
was not that of his employer. This holding must surely be erroneous,
for Joplin was certainly acting within the scope of his authority in
transmitting orders to the company: that was very nearly the only
thing he was to do under his contract of employment. Hence if the
duty exists upon Joplin's part-and there is more question about this
than the court indicates-it must also exist upon his employer's part.
The court was doubtless misled by the fact that the plaintiff attempted
to work out a contract by estoppel instead of stating directly a cause of
action based upon the agent's negligent failure to transmit the offer.-
Should such a duty of promptly transmitting the offer be held to
28, that in view of the nafure of the business, insurance should be effective upon
presentation of a proper application without reference to acceptance, it seems
clear that the company should be privileged to reject risks without regard to
its reasons, i. e., to choose those with whom it wishes to deal. Richards, Insur-
ance (3d ed. igxo) secs. 6o, 94. Hence the criticism of the Dufle case on this
point in (1913) 27 HARv. L. Ray. 92, seems correct. If, however, the company
may be held for its agent's failure to transmit an application promptly, the
applicant is reasonably well protected against the company's delay.
'The court says: "To' hold that the appellant owed the duty of transmitting
to itself for confirmation orders taken in that manner would be absurd. The
very fact that the order must be accepted before the contract is made shows
that the appellant was in no sense a party to the transaction of taking the order.
Joplin had no authority to bind it in any manner." The cases cited'in note 6,
supra, as being contra to the Duffle case seem to question the agent's authority.
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exist?' There are these arguments to the contrary: (i) the lack of
judicial precedents may indicate that such a duty is not contemplated
or relied upon in ordinary business practice; (2) since a similar duty
seems not to exist when the offer is made directly to the offeree it may
be unreasonable for the offeror to rely on the existence of a duty in this
case; and (3) the offeror may protect himself with comparative ease
either by limiting the duration of the offer or by entering into a col-
lateral contract with the agent for an early reply, (such contract appar-
ently being within the scope of the agent's authority) or by making
prompt inquiries. Nevertheless it is submitted that such a duty should
be held to exist and that it is more in accord with business practice so
to hold. The agent's main business is to transmit the offer and surely
the offeror may expect that the agent will do what he is apparently hired
to do. It is not to be expected that the offeror will wish to limit his
offer, all the more if, as would seem from his making it, it is advan-
tageous. Nor should he be required to protect himself in a way which
would thus limit the possibility of making a contract and hence be dis-
advantageous to both parties. Then if it is his place to make inquiries,
when must he start to inquire, that is, when is he to expect that his
offer has gone astray? Is it not unfair to make him responsible for a
failure to guess correctly? Moreover it is well known that the pro-
vision requiring acceptance is only a matter of protection to the seller,
and non-acceptance will be the unusual course.9 Else why is the agent
soliciting orders? In common judgment one buys from the agent.
If the seller has made it an offer instead of a sale it but accords with
business practice to put the affirmative duties connected with acceptance
upon the seller. Therefore rather than force the buyer to make
inquiries, it is fairer to hold that the duty of transmission rests upon
the agent. It might be feasible to consider that under the circum-
stances there was an implied contract to reply promptly to the offer,
but as there seems to be a negligent breach of duty it is unnecessary
to resort to presumptions as to the intentions of the parties.'0
If such duty exists, it would seem breached whether the offer would
have been accepted or not." The acceptability of the offer-a ques-
S Since a suit for the agent's negligence will lie against either the agent or the
principal, where the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, the question
here of duty owed by the principal to the offeror is identical .with that of duty
owed by the agent to the offeror and vice versa.
'Star Clothing Mfg. Co. v. Jones (i92o, Ark.) 218 S. W. 175, a suit by an
agent to collect from his employer commissions on sales. It was held that the
employer had as to the agent a duty to accept all orders from bona fide pur-
chasers made in accordance with the provisions previously specified and could
not refuse to accept because of an advance in market price beyond that at which
the agent was authorized to sell.
"Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n., supra, p. 24 of i6o Iowa.
"In Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n., supra, it is expressly stated by the court
that the jury might have found that in all reasonable probability the application
would have been accepted. But note Dorman v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., supra.
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tion of fact for the jury-would affect simply the question of damages.
If the offer was unacceptable, the damages would be only nominal.
Here, too, an unreasonable delay upon the part of the offeror in making
inquiries may be important as showing that he could not reasonably
have relied so long on the expected acceptance of the contract and
should have taken steps to mitigate the damages. Such questions
would then all be matters of fact for the jury's decision in determining
the amount of recovery.
Another question occurs where the offer is that of a proposed con-
tract for the benefit of a third person.- To whom is then the duty here
in question owed? In the insurance case 12 it was held that it was owed
to the estate of the decedent and not to the proposed beneficiary. This
seems unjust, for the substantial loss falls upon the beneficiary and
not upon the creditors or heirs of the applicant. The loss is that of an
expectancy and while the courts have beenl slow to believe that inter-
ference with an expectancy is a breach of a duty, yet the trend of
decisions seems that way.13  Where the offeror goes so far as to make
an offer of a contract for the benefit of a third party, the requirement
of "immediacy" of the expectancy would seem to be satisfied.1 4 Hence
there would be a breach of duty to the offeror, whose damages are
nominal and a breach of duty to the beneficiary, whose damages are
substantial. But in jurisdictions where such beneficiary is held not
to have a right against the promisor of a contract, this rule of law




Again the question of free speech has come before the Supreme
Court, this time in Schaefer v. United States (March I, 192o) Oct.
Term, 1919, Nos. 270-274. The opinions add little to the Abrams
case. The majority (Justice McKenna) states the contention of thedefendants indicted under the Espionage Law as that "the morale ofthe armies when formed could be weakened or debased by question
'Duffle v. Bankers, Life Ass'n., supra.
"See cases collected in (Ix18) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507. The cases of
injunctions against labor unions are perhaps the commonest. In Hall v. Hall
(r917) 91 Conn. 514, (1917) 27" YALE LAW JOURNAL, 263, such an action in
connection with an expectancy as heir was denied. But see strong dicta inLewis v. Corbin. (I907) 195 Mass. 52o. An early case is Tarleton v. McGarvley
(1793) Peake, 2o5.
" (i9i8) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507.
"But the rule urged in the text should nevertheless exist even in such juris-
dictions in the case of life insurance policies, since the beneficiaries are gener-
ally permitted to sue upon the policies. i Williston, op. cit., sec. 369.
x gig) 40 Sup. Ct. 17. See, for discussion of that case and of the principles
involved, CommE T (r92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337.
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or calumny of the motives of authority, and this could not be made a
crime." "Verdicts and judgments of conviction were the reply to the
challenge and when they were brought here our response to it was
unhesitating and. direct. We did more than reject the contention;
we forestalled all shades of repetition of it. . . ." The dissent
(Justice Brandeis, Justice Holmes concurring) seeks once more to
counter with explicit references to the explicit language and limitations
of language in the unanimous opinions in the Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs cases, 2 insisting that the question of criminality of speech is one
of degree. The special dissent of Justice Clark on the facts of the
particular case is worth note: "I cannot see, as my associates seem
to see, that the disposition of this case involves a great peril either to
the maintenance of law and order and governmental authority. on the
one hand, or to. the freedom of the press on the other. To me it
seems simply a case of flagrant mistrial, likely to result in disgrace
and great injustice, probably in life imprisonment for two old men."
3
If one may judge the effect of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act from Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. (Feb. 10, 1920,
S. D. N. Y:) 62 N. Y. L. J. 1973 (Mar. 14, 1920), the hip pocket
bids fair to' become henceforward a useless ornament of male attire.
For, under this decision, Congress has-and constitutionally-pro-
hibited any transportation of liquors, even from safe deposit vault
to dinner; and the bona fide dwelling has been fixed on as the only
place where one may lawfully possess his liquor. In sober truth, a
man's house would seem to have .become his only castle.
If courts may properly overrule their own previous decisions and
lay down a new rule of law for the determination of the powers,
privileges, rights, and immunities of citizens ;4 and if they may properly
(IM) 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249, 252.
3A careful reading of the three opinions leads one to the conclusion (1) that
wilful obstruction of-recruiting service was not shown, because no effects 
of the
newspaper articles published appeared; but (2) that criminal attempts 
to cause
insubordination were shown, if the majority's test of criminality 
be sound, and
attempts, by mere words, to commit crimes can constitutionally 
be made crimi-
nal, although there is no indication of any danger that the 
crime in question
will be committed; (3) that the publication of false reports with 
intent to
interfere with the success of the forces of the United States 
was shown only
if, when a fourth-rate newspaper condenses for publication news items 
otherwise
permissible, without purporting to reproduce any particular source, such 
con-
densation produces "false" reports within the act.
' See Fowler v. City of Cleveland (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 72, to be commented
on next month, holding that a municipal corporation must pay for injuries 
caused
by the negligence of a driver of a fire hose wagon, and overruling 
Frederick v.
City of Columbus (I898) 58 Ohio St. 538, 5i N. E. 35.
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reverse their own decisions rendered on a previous appeal of the very
same case and on the identical facts and pleadings ;5 it would seem to
be anything but revolutionary for the Supreme Court of the United
States to adopt a new method of announcing its decisions. The an-
tiquity of the custom of announcement by oral reading in open court
is no doubt one reason for continuing to follow it, especially at a time
when so many are ready to condemn any custom for no reason other
than antiquity; but the JOURNAL offers its support to the suggestion
of a change in the present instance, in view of the business loss and
inconvenience caused in the recent case of Eisner v. Macomber (March
8, 1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1919, No. 318, when the newspaper
reporter's misreport of the decision caused a considerable and unfor-
tunate stock market flurry,
The gradual liberalization of the long recalcitrant New York from
its old-time narrow position respecting foreign ex parie divorce decrees
is gratifying. Hubbaid v. Hubbard (Feb. 24, 192o, N. Y.) 62 N. Y.
L. J. 2001tresented the following problem: a man and woman married
in Pennsylvania and separated there, the man later becoming a resident
of New York, the woman of Massachusetts. She there procured an
ex parte divorce decree for desertion. Somewhat'later, the woman
married the pres6nt plaintiff, who was also a resident of Massachusetts,
in North Dakota. Still later each of the couple became residents of
New York. The first husband died. Then the second husband sought
a decree of annulment, alleging the invalidity of the divorce decree.
The court's decision was eminently sane. The marriage had been
valid according to lex loci contractus and according to lex domicilii
of both parties. To be sure: "We are at liberty to inquire into the
validity of the divorce." But New York's public policy-was held not
to require in the circumstances the sanctioning of an attack on a mar-
riage by one party to it, by reason solely of the ex parte character of a
divorce whose procurement the plaintiff had himself instigated8
Scharmann v. Union Pac. Ry. (1919, Minn.) 175 N. W. 554, dis-
cusses the effect of ex parte action even more interesting to the pro-
fession. A locomotive engineer was injured, and employed an attorney-
on a contingent fee of one-third to prosecute suit for him. Action was
brought in Minnesota, issue joined, and the case placed on the calendar
for trial, when an agreement of settlement was arrived at and the
'Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co. (1g91, C. C. A. 2d) 261 Fed. 878, reversitig
(915, C. C. A. 2d) 221 Fed. 8oi.
'The case stands in pliasing contrast to *the stiff policy behind In re Grosnman's
Estate (1919, Pa.) xo6 Atl. 86, 28 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 821. Discussion of the
effect of ex ,parte divorce decrees more at length can be found in COMMENT
(1917) 27 ibid., 117; 01913) 23 ibid., 88.
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action dismissed. Later, the settlement never being consummated, a
new action was brought. This time the plaintiff settled for less money,
and dismissed the action without letting his attorney know anything
about it. Later the defendant sought in Nebraska to 'interplead the
attorney and the plaintiff's, representatives, paying one-third of the
second settlement into court. A default was entered against the attor-
ney, and his claim adjudged void for- champerty. But when the
attorney applied to the Minnesota court to reinstate his cause and
allow him to intervene and enforce his lien, his application was granted.
The court held the Nebraska court's action to be a nullity, both as to the
judgment, and as to the findings on which it was based. For if an
attorney be employed in Minnesota, and a Minnesota court once
acquires jurisdiction of the cause of action and of the parties, the
attorney's lien on the cause of action is and remains subject to Minne-
sota law, as against ex parte action elsewhere.
All lovers of legal theory, however, will feel distressed that the
attorney was not served personally in Nebraska. It would be very
interesting to discover whether the Minnesota court would in such a
pinch adhere to the strong hints dropped in its discussion: that the
law-suit in this case was a Minnesota res, subject exclusively to the
control of the courts of suit. How far the decree of a foreign court
of equity regarding land will be recognized at the situs is still a
matter of dispute.T Must one refer to the same rules, as to attorney's
liens ?
So that the times are not wholly dark for the lawyers, despite the
rulings on the income tax. It is good, too, to see a serious attempt
being made to check the more objectionable features of "claim-adjust-
ment." Texas passed statutes on the subject, prohibiting personal
solicitation of employment in law-suits. But the courts held that the
statute applied only to lawyers, which left the bulk of the evil un-
touched. So the legislature amended the law to cover claim adjisters
and collectors. The new provision, under attack as a deprivation of
liberty and property, has been upheld in McCloskey v. Tobin (March
I, 1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1919, No. 79. Admitting that tort
,claims, once made assignable, become an article of commerce, still says
the court, "to prohibit solicitation is to regulate the business, not to
prohibit it," and so within the power of the legislature.
' See Barbour, The Extra-territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (1919) 17
I IcH. L. REV. 527.
